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Abstract
We extend the analysis of a possibility of negative royalty in licensing under oligopoly
with an outside or an incumbent innovator by Liao and Sen (2005) to a case of oligopoly
with vertical product diﬀerentiation under general distribution function of consumer’
taste parameter and general cost functions. We consider both outside innovator case and
incumbent innovator case. When the non-licensee does not drop out of the market; in the
outside innovator case, if the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes (or complements),
the optimal royalty rate is negative (or may be negative or positive); in the incumbent
innovator case, if the goods are strategic substitutes (or complements), the optimal royalty
rate may be negative or positive (is positive). When the non-licensee drops out of the
market with negative royalty; in both cases, 1) If the goods are strategic substitutes, the
optimal royalty rate is negative, 2) If the goods are strategic complements, the optimal
royalty rate is positive.
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1. Introduction
Liao and Sen (2005) analyzed a problem of licensing by a combination of a royalty per
output and a fixed fee in an oligopoly with an outside or an incumbent innovator which has
a cost reducing technology. They showed that when there are one licensee and one non-
licensee, the innovator imposes a negative royalty with a positive fixed fee on the licensee.
They assumed, however, linear demand and cost functions (constant marginal costs). In this
paper we extend their analysis to a case of an oligopoly with vertical product diﬀerentiation
in which an innovating firm has a technology for producing a high-quality good under general
distribution function of consumers’ taste parameter and general cost functions1.
We consider two cases of oligopoly. The first is a case where the innovator is an outside
firm, and the second is a case where it is an incumbent firm. Also about the innovation we
consider two cases. The first is a case where the non-licensee continues to operate even with
negative royalty, and the second is a case where the non-licensee drops out of the market. In
the latter case the innovation is said to be drastic. However, we assume that the output of the
non-licensee is positive when the royalty rate is zero.
We will show the following results. When the non-licensee does not drop out of the market;
1. In the outside innovator case:
i) If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative.
ii) If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate may
be negative or positive.
2. In the incumbent innovator case:
i) If the goods are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate may be negative or
positive.
ii) If the goods are strategic complements, then the optimal royalty rate is positive.
When the non-licensee drops out of the market, in both cases, if the goods are strategic
substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative, and if the goods are strategic complements, the
optimal royalty rate is positive.
In the next section we present the model of this paper, in Section 3 we analyze the outside
innovator case, in Section 4 we study the incumbent innovator case, and in Section 5 we present
an example of uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter and linear cost functions. In
Appendix we present analyses of demand and inverse demand functions.
In this paper we analyse only a problem of a possibility of negative royalty with one licensee
and one non-license. For an outside innovator or an incumbent innovator with two potential
licensees whether it sells a license to one firm, or sells licenses to two firms is an important
problem. How ever, such an analysis may be complicated under general distribution function
and general cost functions. It is a theme of the future research.
1Recently, Sen and Stamatopoulos (1980) presented an analysis of royalty and fixed fee in a duopoly under
general demand and cost functions. They did not considered a possibility of negative royalty.
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2. Themodel
Ourmodel of vertical product diﬀerentiation is according toMussa andRosen (1978), Bonanno
and Haworth (1998) and Tanaka (2001). There are three firms. The innovator, the licensee
and the non-licensee. We call the innovator Firm I, the licensee Firm A and the non-licensee
Firm B. Firm I can produce the high-quality good whose quality is kH , Firm A produces the
low-quality good whose quality is kL , but it can produce the high-quality good buying the
license, and Firm B produces the low-quality good, where kH > kL > 0. kH and kL are
fixed. Both of the high-quality and low-quality goods are produced at the same cost. The cost
function of the goods is denoted by c(·). It is twice continuously diﬀerentiable. The innovator
imposes a royalty per output and a fixed fee on Firm A. Denote the royalty rate by r , and the
fixed license fee by D.
In the market there is a continuum of consumers with the same income, denoted by y, but
diﬀerent values of the taste parameter ξ. Each consumer buys at most one unit of the good.
If a consumer with parameter ξ buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility is
equal to y − p + ξk. If a consumer does not buy any good, his utility is equal to his income
y. The parameter ξ is distributed according to a smooth distribution function ρ = F(ξ) in the
interval 0 < ξ ≤ 1. ρ denotes the probability that the taste parameter is smaller than or equal
to ξ. The size of consumers is normalized as one. The inverse function of F(ξ) is denoted by
G(ρ). They are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and we have F′(ξ) > 0 and G′(ρ) > 0. Note
that G(1) = 1. Let pL be the price of the good of quality kL and pH be the price of the good of
quality kH .
If Firm I is an outside innovator, the market is a duopoly with Firms A and B. If Firm I is an
incumbent firm, the market is an oligopoly with three firms. Let qA and qB be the outputs of
Firms A and B. The output of Firm I is denoted by qI if it is an incumbent firm.
We consider two cases about the properties of the goods. A case where the goods of firms
are strategic substitutes and a case where the goods of firms are strategic complements. Also
about the market structure we consider two cases. The first is a case where the non-licensee
continues to operate even with negative royalty, and the second is a case where the non-licensee
drops out of the market. In the latter case the innovation is said to be drastic. We assume that
with zero royalty the output of Firm B is positive in both of the outside innovator case and the
incumbent innovator case.
3. Outside innovator
In this section we suppose that Firm I is an outside innovator.
Let ξL be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
ξL =
pL
kL
.
Let ξH be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
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the low-quality good and the high-quality good. Then
ξH =
pH − pL
kH − kL .
Let qH = qA and qL = qB. The inverse demand function is described as follows.
1. When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
2. When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
3. When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
4. When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
Since G(1) = 1, this is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ qH ≤ 1. For details of derivation of the inverse demand function please see Appendix
A.1.
The profits of Firm A net of the royalty and the profit of Firm B are
piA = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qA) + kLG(1 − qA − qB)]qA − c(qA) − rqA,
piB = kLG(1 − qA − qB)qB − c(qB).
To determine the total license fee we consider auction policy by the innovator according to
Liao and Sen (2005). If Firm A refuses the payment of license fee, Firm B buys the license.
Therefore, the willingness to pay of Firm A is the diﬀerence between its profit as a licensee
and the profit of a non-licensee, that is, piA − piB. Thus, we have
L = piA − piB.
The payoﬀ of the innovator is the sum of the royalty and the fixed license fee. Denote it by ϕ.
Then,
ϕ = L+rqA = [(kH−kL)G(1−qA)+kLG(1−qA−qB)]qA−c(qA)−[kLG(1−qA−qB)qB−c(qB)].
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
∂piA
∂qA
=(kH − kL)G(1 − qA) + kLG(1 − qA − qB) (1)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB)]qA − c′(qA) − r = 0,
and
∂piB
∂qB
= kLG(1 − qA − qB) − kLG′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) = 0. (2)
Let
θA =
∂2piA
∂q2A
= −2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qA) + kLG′(1 − qA − qB)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB)]qA − c′′(qA),
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θB =
∂2piB
∂q2B
= −kL2G′(1 − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB)qB − c′′(qB),
σA =
∂2piA
∂qAqB
= −kLG′(1 − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB)qA,
and
σB =
∂2piB
∂qBqA
= −kLG′(1 − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qA − qB)qB.
The second order conditions are
θA < 0,
and
θB < 0.
Diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to r yields
θA
dqA
dr
+ σA
dqB
dr
= 1,
and
σB
dqA
dr
+ θB
dqB
dr
= 0.
From them we obtain
dqA
dr
=
θB
∆
,
and
dqB
dr
= −σB
∆
,
where
∆ = θAθB − σAσB.
We assume
∆ > 0.
Also we assume
|θA | > |σA |,
and
|θB | > |σB |.
These assumptions are derived from the stability conditions for duopoly (see Seade (1980)
and Dixit (1986)). We get
dqA
dr
< 0,
and dqAdr  > dqBdr  .
We say that the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes when σB < 0 and strategic
complements when σB > 0. Then, we obtain
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1. When the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, dqBdr > 0.
2. When the goods of the firms are strategic complements, dqBdr < 0.
The condition for maximization of ϕ with respect to r is
dϕ
dr
=λA
dqA
dr
+ λB
dqB
dr
=(r + kLG′(1 − qA − qB)qB)dqAdr − kLG
′(1 − qA − qB)qA dqBdr = 0,
where
λA =
∂piA
∂qA
+ r − ∂piB
∂qA
= r + kLG
′(1 − qA − qB)qB,
and
λB =
∂piA
∂qB
− ∂piB
∂qB
= −kLG′(1 − qA − qB)qA.
Then, we obtain the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r˜ = − kLG
′(1 − qA − qB)
dqA
dr
(
qB
dqA
dr
− qA dqBdr
)
. (3)
Now we assume
G(1 − qA) − G′(1 − qA)qA > 0. (4)
The first order condition for Firm A in (1) means
(kH − kL)[G(1−qA)−G′(1−qA)qA]+ kL[G(1−qA−qB)−G′(1−qA−qB)qA] = c′(qA)+r > 0.
Thus, (4) will hold.
Diﬀerentiating (1) and (2) with respect to kH , we obtain
dqA
dkH
= −θB(G(1 − qA) − G
′(1 − qA)qA)
∆
> 0,
and
dqB
dkH
=
σB(G(1 − qA) − G′(1 − qA)qA)
∆
.
dqB
dkH
has the same sign as that of σB. Since |θB | > |σB |, we have
 dqAdkH  >  dqBdkH . The larger the
value of kH is, the larger the value of qA − qB is.
We show the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. In the case where the non-licensee continues to operate we obtain the following
results.
1. If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative.
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2. If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate may be
negative or positive.
Proof. 1. If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, we have dqBdr > 0. Then, r˜ < 0
because − kLG′(1−qA−qB)dqA
dr
> 0.
2. If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, we have dqBdr < 0. Then, r˜ < 0 or
r˜ > 0 depending on qB dqAdr − qA dqBdr < 0 or qB dqAdr − qA dqBdr > 0.
If qB is suﬃciently smaller than qA although Firm B does not drop out, it is
likely that qB dqAdr − qA dqBdr > 0 and r˜ > 0.
□
Proposition 2. In the case where the non-licensee drops out of the market we obtain the
following results.
1. If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative.
2. If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate is positive.
Proof. 1. If
dϕ
dr

qB=0
= r
dqA
dr
− kLG′(1 − qA)qA dqBdr > 0,
then, qB > 0 at the optimal state for the innovator and we have the previous case.
On the other hand, if dϕdr ≤ 0 when qB = 0, the licensee is a monopolist and the optimal
royalty rate for the innovator is one such that qB = 0. It is negative because qB > 0 with
zero royalty and dqBdr > 0.
If Firm A is the monopolist, the payoﬀ of Firm I is equal to the profit of Firm
A including the royalty. It is maximized by zero royalty rate. However, since
qB > 0 when r = 0, the optimal royalty rate is one at which Firm B just drops
out. Please see an example in Section 5.
2. If dϕdr < 0 at qB = 0, then qB > 0 at the optimal state for the innovator and we have the
previous case.
On the other hand, if dϕdr ≥ 0 at qB = 0, then the licensee is a monopolist and the optimal
royalty rate for the innovator is one such that qB = 0. It is positive because qB > 0 with
zero royalty and dqBdr < 0.
□
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4. Incumbent innovator
In this section we suppose that the innovator is an incumbent firm. Firm I as well as Firm A
produce the high-quality good. Only Firm B produces the low-quality good. Let qH = qI + qA
and qL = qB. Similarly to the previous case the inverse demand function is described as
follows.
1. When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
2. When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
3. When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
4. When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
The profit of Firm I, that of Firm A net of the royalty and that of Firm B are
piI = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qI − qA) + kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qI − c(qI),
piA = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qI − qA) + kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qA − c(qA) − rqA,
and
piB = kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB − c(qB).
The fixed license fee, L, satisfies the following relation.
L = piA − piB.
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms I, A and B are
∂piI
∂qI
=(kH − kL)G(1 − qI − qA) + kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB) (5)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qI − c′(qI) = 0,
∂piA
∂qA
=(kH − kL)G(1 − qI − qA) + kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB) (6)
− [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qA − c′(qA) − r = 0,
and
∂piB
∂qB
= kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB) − kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB − c′(qB) = 0. (7)
Let
θI =
∂2piI
∂q2I
= −2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qI − c′′(qI),
θA =
∂2piA
∂q2A
= −2[(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qA − c′′(qA),
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θB =
∂2piB
∂q2B
= −2kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB − c′′(qB),
σI A =
∂2piI
∂qIqA
= −(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA) − kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qI,
σIB =
∂2piI
∂qIqB
= −kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qI,
σAI =
∂2piA
∂qAqI
= −(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA) − kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)
+ [(kH − kL)G′′(1 − qI − qA) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qA,
σAB =
∂2piA
∂qAqB
= −kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qA,
and
σB =
∂2piB
∂qBqA
=
∂2piB
∂qBqI
= −kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB) + kLG′′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB.
The second order conditions are
θI < 0,
θA < 0,
and
θB < 0.
Diﬀerentiating (5) , (6) and (7) with respect to r yields
θI
dqI
dr
+ σI A
dqA
dr
+ σIB
dqB
dr
= 0,
σAI
dqI
dr
+ θA
dqA
dr
+ σAB
dqB
dr
= 1,
σB
dqI
dr
+ σB
dqA
dr
+ θB
dqB
dr
= 0.
From them we obtain
dqI
dr
= −θBσI A − σIBσB
Γ
,
dqA
dr
=
θBθI − σIBσB
Γ
,
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dqB
dr
= −(θI − σI A)σB
Γ
,
where
Γ = θIθAθB − σABσBθI − σIBσBθA − σI AσAIθB + σI AσABσB + σIBσAIσB.
We assume
Γ < 0.
Also we assume
θIθB − σIBσB > 0,
|θI | > |σI A |, |θI | > |σIB |, |θA | > |σAI |, |θA | > |σAB |, |θB | > |σB |.
These assumptions are derived from the stability conditions for oligopoly (see Seade (1980)
and Dixit (1986)). We have
dqA
dr
< 0.
Further, we assume that θI , θA and θB have larger absolute values than those of σB, σIB, σI A,
σAB and σAI . Then, we can think that the following relations are satisfieddqAdr  > dqIdr  , dqAdr  > dqBdr  .
We say that the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes when σI A, σAI, σIB, σBI and σB
are negative, and strategic complements when σI A, σAI, σIB, σBI and σB are positive. Then,
we obtain
1. When the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, dqIdr > 0 and
dqB
dr > 0.
2. When the goods of the firms are strategic complements, dqIdr < 0 and
dqB
dr < 0.
The payoﬀ of the innovator is the sum of the royalty, the fixed license fee and its profit as a
firm in the oligopoly. Denote it by ϕ. Then,
ϕ =piI + L + rqA = [(kH − kL)G(1 − qI − qA) + kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qI − c(qI)
+ [(kH − kL)G(1 − qI − qA) + kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB)]qA − c(qA)
− [kLG(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB − c(qB)].
The condition for maximization of ϕ with respect to r is
dϕ
dr
=λI
dqI
dr
+ λA
dqA
dr
− λB dqBdr
=r
dqA
dr
− (kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA)
(
qA
dqI
dr
+ qI
dqA
dr
)
− kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)
[
(qA − qB)dqIdr + (qI − qB)
dqA
dr
+ (qI + qA)dqBdr
]
= 0,
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where, using the first order conditions,
λI =
∂piI
∂qI
+
∂piA
∂qI
− ∂piB
∂qI
= − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA)qA + kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qA]
+ kLG
′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB,
λA =
∂piI
∂qA
+
∂piA
∂qA
+ r − ∂piB
∂qA
=r − [(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA)qI + kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qI]
+ kLG
′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qB,
and
λB =
∂piI
∂qB
+
∂piA
∂qB
− ∂piB
∂qB
= −kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qI − kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qA.
Then, we get the optimal royalty rate for the innovator as follows.
r˜ =
(kH − kL)G′(1 − qI − qA)
dqA
dr
(
qA
dqI
dr
+ qI
dqA
dr
)
(8)
+
kLG′(1 − qI − qA − qB)
dqA
dr
[
(qA − qB)dqIdr + (qI − qB)
dqA
dr
+ (qI + qA)dqBdr
]
.
Now we assume {
G(1 − qI − qA) − G′(1 − qI − qA)qI > 0,
G(1 − qI − qA) − G′(1 − qI − qA)qA > 0.
(9)
The first order conditions for Firm I and Firm A, (5) and (6), mean
(kH − kL)[G(1 − qI − qA) − G′(1 − qI − qA)qI]
+ kL[G(1 − qI − qA − qB) − G′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qI] = c′(qI) > 0,
and
(kH − kL)[G(1 − qI − qA) − G′(1 − qI − qA)qA]
+ kL[G(1 − qI − qA − qB) − G′(1 − qI − qA − qB)qA] = c′(qA) + r > 0.
Thus, (9) will hold.
Diﬀerentiating (5) , (6) and (7) with respect to kH , we obtain
dqI
dkH
= −ηI(θAθB − σABσB) − ηA(θBσI A − σIBσB)
Γ
,
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dqA
dkH
= −ηA(θBθI − σBσIB) − ηI(θBσAI − σABσB)
Γ
,
dqB
dkH
=
σB[ηA(θI − σI A) + ηI(θA − σAI)]
Γ
.
where
ηI = G(1 − qI − qA) − G′(1 − qI − qA)qI > 0,
ηA = G(1 − qI − qA) − G′(1 − qI − qA)qA > 0.
We assume
1. θI , θA and θB have larger absolute values than those of σB, σIB, σI A, σAB and σAI .
2. ηI and ηA have similar values.
Then, we can think that the following relations are satisfied
dqI
dkH
> 0,
dqA
dkH
> 0,
dqI
dkH
− dqB
dkH
> 0,
dqA
dkH
− dqB
dkH
> 0.
The larger the value of kH is, the larger the values of qI − qB and qA − qB are.
We show the following two propositions.
Proposition 3. In the case where the non-licensee continues to operate we obtain the following
results.
1. If the goods are strategic substitutes, then the optimal royalty rate may be negative or
positive.
2. If the goods are strategic complements, then the optimal royalty rate is positive.
Proof. 1. If the goods are strategic substitutes, dqIdr > 0,
dqA
dr < 0 and
dqB
dr > 0. Then, since
qA
dqI
dr > 0, qI
dqA
dr < 0, (qA − qB) dqIdr > 0, (qI − qB) dqAdr < 0 and (qI + qA) dqBdr > 0, the
optimal royalty rate in (8) may be negative or positive.
An example in the next section demonstrates that the optimal royalty rate is likely to be
positive when kH is large.
2. If the goods are strategic complements, dqIdr ,
dqA
dr and
dqB
dr are all negative. Then,
dϕ
dr when
r = 0 is positive because qI − qB > 0, qA − qB > 0 and qI + qA > 0. Thus, the optimal
royalty rate is positive.
□
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Proposition 4. In the case where the non-licensee drops out of the market we obtain the
following results.
1. If the goods of the firms are strategic substitutes, the optimal royalty rate is negative.
2. If the goods of the firms are strategic complements, the optimal royalty rate is positive.
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Note
dϕ
dr

qB=0
=r
dqA
dr
− kHG′(1 − qI − qA)
(
qA
dqI
dr
+ qI
dqA
dr
)
− kLG′(1 − qI − qA)(qI + qA)dqBdr .
Proof. 1. If
dϕ
dr

qB=0
> 0,
then, qB > 0 at the optimal state for the innovator and we have the previous case.
On the other hand, if dϕdr ≤ 0 when qB = 0, the market is a duopoly with the innovator
and the licensee, and the optimal royalty rate for the innovator is one such that qB = 0.
It is negative because qB > 0 with zero royalty and dqBdr > 0.
In the example below we will see that if consumers’ taste parameter has a
uniform distribution and the cost functions are linear, there exists no case
where Firm B drops out under the assumption that its output when r = 0 is
positive.
In another research (Hattori and Tanaka (2017)) we have shown that in the
duopolistic situation with the innovator and the licensee without non-licensee
the optimal royalty rate is positive and depends on the form of cost functions;
whether they are concave or convex.
2. If dϕdr < 0 at qB = 0, then qB > 0 at the optimal state for the innovator and we have the
previous case.
On the other hand, if dϕdr ≥ 0 at qB = 0, then the market is a duopoly with the innovator
and the licensee, and the optimal royalty rate for the innovator is one such that qB = 0.
It is positive because qB > 0 with zero royalty and dqBdr < 0.
□
5. An example of uniform distribution and constant
marginal costs
Assume that ρ = F(ξ) has a uniform distribution, the (common) cost function is linear and
there is no fixed cost. Then, ρ = ξ, ξ = G(ρ) = ρ, F′(ξ) = G′(ρ) = 1 and F′′(ξ) = G′′(ρ) = 0.
The marginal cost is denoted by c. Assume 0 < c < kL . In this example the goods of the firms
are strategic substitutes because G′′ = 0.
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5.1. Outside innovator
When the innovator is an outside firm and the non-licensee does not drop out of the market,
the equilibrium values of the variables are obtained as follows.
qA =
2kH − kL − c − 2r
4kH − kL , qB =
kLr + kHkL + ckL − 2ckH
kL(4kH − kL) ,
pH =
2k2H + 3ckH − kLr + 2kHr − kHkL − ckL
4kH − kL , pL =
kLr + kHkL + 2ckH
4kH − kL .
The total license fee which is the sum of the royalty and the fixed fee is
ϕ =
k2HkL + c
2kL − c2kH − kLr2 − k2Lr + ckLr − kHk2L
kL(4kH − kL) .
The optimal royalty rate for the innovator is
r˜ = − kL − c
2
< 0.
A case where non-licensee drops out In this example there may exist a case where Firm B
drops out under the assumption that its output when r = 0 is positive if c < kL < 2c. Since
qB |r=0 = kH kL+ckL−2ckLkL(4kH−kL) > 0, we need
kHkL + ckL − 2ckH > 0.
When qB = 0,
r = − kHkL + ckL − 2ckH
kL
.
Then,
dϕ
dr

qB=0
=
2kHkL + 3ckL − k2L − 4ckH
kL(4kH − kL) =
(kL − 2c)(kH − kL) + kHkL + ckL − 2ckH
kL(4kH − kL) .
If c < kL < 2c, this may be negative. If it is so, by 1 of Proposition 4 the optimal royalty rate
is negative. Then, calculating the equilibrium values of the variables assuming the monopoly
of Firm A, the total license fee is
ϕ|qB=0 =
(kH − c − r)(kH − c + r)
4kH
.
It is maximized by r = 0. However, by the assumption qB > 0 when r = 0. Therefore, the
optimal royalty rate is
− kHkL + ckL − 2ckH
kL
.
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Figure 1: Relation between kH and the optimal royalty rate in the incumbent innovator case
5.2. Incumbent innovator
When the innovator is an incumbent firm, the equilibrium values of the variables are obtained
as follows.
qI =
2k2H − ckH − kLr + 2kHr − kHkL
2kH(3kH − kL) , qA =
kLr − 4kHr − kHkL + 2k2H − ckH
2kH(3kH − kL) ,
qB =
kLr + kHkL + 2ckL − 3ckH
2kL(3kH − kL) ,
pH =
2k2H + 5ckH − kLr + 2kHr − kHkL − 2ckL
2(3kH − kL) , pL =
kLr + kHkL + 3ckH
2(3kH − kL) .
The total payoﬀ of the innovator which is the sum of the royalty, the fixed fee and the profit of
the innovator as a firm in the oligopoly is
A
4kL(3kH − kL)2),
where
A =k2Lr
2 − 4kHkLr2 + 2k3Lr − 8kHk2Lr − 2ck2Lr + 4k2HkLr + 4ckHkLr + 2kHk3L
− 9k2Hk2L − 4c2k2L + 8k3HkL − 2ck2HkL + 14c2kHkL − 9c2k2H .
The optimal royalty rate for the innovator is
r =
k2L − 4kHkL − ckL + 2k2H + 2ckH
4kH − kL .
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Figure 2: Relations among kH and the outputs of the firms in the incumbent innovator case
This may be positive or negative. An example, assuming c = 2, kL = 4, kL < kH < 8, is
depicted in Figure 1. qB > 0 when r = 0 and kH < 8. This figure demonstrates that the
optimal royalty rate is likely to be positive when kH is large. The outputs of the firms in this
example are positive as shown in Figure 2. In Figure 3 the relations among kH , the royalty, the
fixed fee and the profit of the innovator are depicted.
Acasewherenon-licenseedropsout In this example of uniform distribution and linear cost
functions we can show that there exists no case where Firm B drops out under the assumption
that its output when r = 0 is positive.
Since qB |r=0 = kH kL+2ckL−3ckH2kL(3kH−kL) > 0, we need
kHkL + 2ckL − 3ckH > 0.
When qB = 0,
r = − kHkL + 2ckL − 3ckH
kL
.
Then,
dϕ
dr

qB=0
=
2kHkL − k2L + 3ckL − 4ckH
2kL(3kH − kL) =
(kH − kL)(kL − c) + kHkL + 2ckL − 3ckH
2kL(3kH − kL) > 0.
By 1 of Proposition 4 qB > 0 at the optimal royalty rate because the goods are strategic
substitutes.
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Figure 3: Relations among kH , the royalty, the fixed fee and the profit of the innovator in the
incumbent innovator case
6. Concluding Remark
We have examined a possibility of negative royalty under vertical product diﬀerentiation with
an outside or an incumbent innovator, and have shown that the results depend on the property
of the goods, whether they are strategic substitutes or complements.
In the future research we want to extend the analysis in this paper to, for example, an
oligopoly with endogenous quality choice.
A. Appendix: Detailed analysis of demand functions
If a consumer with taste parameter ξ buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility
is equal to y − p + ξk. Let ξ0 be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is
indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then,
ξ0 =
pH
kH
.
Let ξL be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
ξL =
pL
kL
.
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Let ξH be the value of ξ for which the corresponding consumer is indiﬀerent between buying
the low-quality good and buying the high-quality good. Then
ξH =
pH − pL
kH − kL .
We find
ξ0 =
(kH − kL)ξH + kLξL
kH
.
Therefore, ξL ≥ ξ0 ≥ ξH or ξH > ξ0 > ξL .
For ξ > (<)ξL ,
y − pL + ξkL > (<)y.
For ξ > (<)ξ0,
y − pH + ξkH > (<)y.
For ξ > (<)ξH ,
y − pH + ξkH > (<)y − pL + ξkL .
A.1. Outside innovator case
In this case Firm A produces the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality good.
Demand for the high quality good, qH , and demand for the low-quality good, qL , are as follows.
1. When pH ≥ kH (ξ0 ≥ 1) and pL ≥ kL (ξL ≥ 1), we have qH = 0 and qL = 0.
2. When pH < kH (ξ0 < 1) and pL ≥ pHkH kL (ξL ≥ ξ0 ≥ ξH), we have qH = 1 − F(ξ0) and
qL = 0.
3. When pL < kL (ξL < 1), pH > pLkL kH (ξH > ξ0 > ξL) and pH − pL ≥ kH − kL (ξH ≥ 1),
we have qH = 0 and qL = 1 − F(ξL).
4. When pL < kL (ξL < 1), pH > kHkL pL (ξH > ξ0 > ξL) and pH − pL < kH − kL (ξH < 1),
we have qL = F(ξH) − F(ξL) and qH = 1 − F(ξH).
From this demand function we obtain the inverse demand function as follows.
1. When qH > 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = (kH − kL)G(1 − qH) + kLG(1 − qH − qL) and
pL = kLG(1 − qH − qL).
2. When qH > 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kHG(1 − qH) and pL = kLG(1 − qH).
3. When qH = 0 and qL > 0, we have pH = kH − kL + kLG(1− qL) and pL = kLG(1− qL).
4. When qH = 0 and qL = 0, we have pH = kH and pL = kL .
This is a continuously diﬀerentiable function with the domain 0 ≤ qH ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ qL ≤ 1.
We have qH = qA and qL = qB.
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A.2. Incumbent innovator case
In this case Firms I and A produce the high-quality good, and Firm B produces the low-quality
good. The inverse demand function is the same as that in the previous case with qH = qI + qA
and qL = qB.
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